

## Chapter 4

# **The Summits of the Americas: Continuities and Changes in the Hemispheric Agenda of William Clinton and George W. Bush**

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This chapter examines the foreign policy of the United States during the governments of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, aimed at establishing continuities and changes, regarding both the global strategy of the country and in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean. Concerning the latter, the analysis refers to presidential/summits diplomacy, considered by the last two administrations as a privileged place when constructing a new architecture of hemispherical relationships. We refer to the period of the summit meetings in Miami, Santiago, Quebec, and Mar del Plata, between 1994 and 2005, as well as the extraordinary summit in Monterrey in 2004.

The conceptions that guide the international positioning of the United States by the Democratic and Republican governments express strong elements of continuity. Substantial disagreements with regards to the definition of interests, challenges, and threats, especially in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean have not been verified. The unfolding of events following September 11, 2001, basically reinforce the differences that were already present in the initial period of Bush's term in office, making its imposing character more explicit in reaching essentially similar objectives.

### **The New Lineaments of Foreign Policy**

As the first elected government in the period subsequent to the cold war, the Clinton administration had the important task of formulating a new foreign policy regarding the country's international positioning, in a process that implied a wider debate concerning the establishment of national interests and strategic goals.

Although there is not much divergence in the fundamental orientation during the two presidential terms, we consider that in the second term, under



the direction of Madeleine Albright in the Department of State, guidelines of foreign policy have been consolidated, with the clear definition of short, medium, and long-term objectives.

In his address at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University, Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State in the first term, analyzing his administration, highlights two aspects that he considers fundamental in his mandate: first, the country's ever-increasing international involvement, attempting to respond to an agenda of new challenges; second, the cut in the international affairs budget.

When our Administration took office in 1993, we faced an array of challenges that required urgent attention. Russia's democracy was in crisis; its economy was near collapse. The nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union was scattered among four new countries with few safeguards. The war in Bosnia was at the peak of its brutality and threatening to spread. North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. The Middle East peace process was stalemated; negotiations were stymied. Repression in Haiti was pushing refugees to our shores. NAFTA's passage was in serious doubt, threatening our relations with the entire hemisphere.<sup>1</sup>

In Christopher's evaluation, the new world order requires a more engaged posture from the United States: "Because of our military and economic might, because we are trusted to uphold universal values, there are times when only America can lead."<sup>2</sup> In order to meet the requirements of this leadership, it is necessary to count on adequate resources. However, according to the data presented by the secretary, based on 1985, there was a reduction of 50 percent in the amount spent on international affairs.<sup>3</sup> In relation to the programs of foreign aid, the expenditure was reduced by 37 percent.

When criticizing budget cuts, especially aimed at the supporters of isolationism, the Secretary synthesizes the relevance of the (United States) foreign policy to overcome the problems that affect the internal order of the country:

Americans are proud that we are the world's leading nation and they know leadership carries responsibilities. They see the evidence that isolationists miss: that the security of our nation depends on the readiness of our diplomats as our first line of defense; that the safety of our streets depends on our fight against drugs and terror abroad; that our jobs at home depend on the health of the global economy.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast with the limited resources faced by Christopher, Albright highlights the 17 percent increase obtained in her administration, leaving her successor the most favorable budgetary situation since the 1990s.<sup>5</sup>

The reversion of this declining trend concerning the attribution of governmental resources for international affairs was considered one of the main priorities in Albright's administration. The argument presented to the U.S. Congress regarding the need to increase the budget for the year 2001 concisely reveals the main lineaments of the foreign policy in the Clinton period.

Although our economy is strong and our military unmatched, there remain serious dangers to our interests. These include terrorists, possible conflicts in key regions, the risk of another financial crisis, drug trafficking, and the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

In addition to the threats, there are opportunities to serve U.S. interests by bringing nations closer together around basic principles of democracy, open markets, the rule of law and a commitment to peace.<sup>6</sup>

In consonance with these lineaments, there is a change of approach in relation to foreign aid. Expenditure on global involvement is not accounted for as lost funds in causes whose impact in the quality of life of the country's citizens is uncertain. By justifying each program formulated by the Department of State, national interests are clearly defined.

The proposed budget for 2001 shows good examples of the accounting for loss and profit that characterizes the new posture, articulating in the same course of action themes such as the promotion of trade agreements and exploitation of labor that is considered inhumane.

In relation to free trade,

Since President Clinton took office, we have negotiated more than 300 agreements to help reduce tariffs on the sale of American goods and services. Today, trade is responsible for more than 11 million U.S. jobs. U.S. exports to the developing world—our fastest growing trade partner—totaled \$275 billion in 1997 alone.<sup>7</sup>

Concerning the topic of promotion of democracy,

A key objective of U.S. foreign policy is to promote values that reflect the interests, character, and ideals of the American people. We do this because it is right, but also because it is smart. Compared to dictatorships, democratic nations are more likely to be stable, better able to cope with financial stress, more reliable trading partners, and less likely to generate refugees or contribute to other global problems.<sup>8</sup>

Linked to this theme in the agenda, we highlight the combat against inhumane labor conditions:

We have also taken the lead in a global effort to ban the worst forms of child labor, and to establish core standards to prevent the exploitation of workers overseas, while giving American workers a more level playing field on which to compete. We continue to argue that labor impacts should be considered when trade agreements are negotiated.<sup>9</sup>

The increase in the attraction of budgetary resources is a fundamental component in a bigger strategy of valuing the role of the Department of State in the defense of the "American way of life."

In the next section, we analyze documents of the USAID (United States Agency for International Development), attached to the Department of



State, which illustrate the main lineaments in the Albright administration, especially in relation to the "transition countries," which includes Latin American and the Caribbean.

### Governance and Foreign Aid

In her address in the conference *Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Societies*, promoted by the USAID, in October 1997, Secretary Albright divides the world into four categories of countries:

those that participate as full members of the international system; those that are in transition and seek to participate more fully; those that reject the rules upon which the system is based; and finally, the states that are unable—for reasons of underdevelopment, catastrophe, or conflict—to enjoy the benefits and meet the responsibilities that full membership in the system entails.<sup>10</sup>

In parallel with the fears, when situations of conflict in the countries in "transition and development" arise, there is a positive perception associated to the potential of expanding business. In this aspect, foreign aid meets a variety of the country's interests:

We have an economic interest in opening new opportunities for American commerce and in preventing new demands on the sources we have available for emergency relief and refugees. We have a budgetary and social interest in helping the people of other countries to build a future for themselves at home. . . . We have a political interest in helping post-conflict societies to embrace democracy and to become part of the solution to global threats such as proliferation, pollution, illegal narcotics, and transnational crime. Finally, we have a humanitarian interest in helping those who have survived the cauldron of war or—in a case such as Haiti, the cruelty of repression—to revitalize their societies.<sup>11</sup>

USAID's Strategic Plan, formulated in 1997 and updated in 2000, seeks to give an answer to the combination of interests and foreign aid commitments defined by Albright, which had seven goals associated with the promotion of sustainable development: (1) encouraging economic growth, with an emphasis on agriculture, the main livelihood for the population of poor countries; (2) the strengthening of democracy and good governance; (3) human qualifications based on education and training, stimulating change in the distribution of public funding in basic education; (4) stabilizing the world's population and protecting human health; (5) protecting the environment, considering long term sustainability; (6) humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters or violence; (7) maintaining the USAID as the main bilateral agency for assisting development, providing it with an adequate infrastructure.

We analyze the programs related to the second goal, given the relevance attributed to democracy in the global engagement policy of the Clinton

administration, which is one of the pillars (together with free trade) of the agenda for the development of the "transition" countries.

The work surrounding the strengthening of democracy and good governance is based on four objectives, which are related to the applied initiatives:<sup>12</sup> (1) the rule of law and respect for human rights, especially of women, with initiatives aimed at the strengthening of institutions of the justice system, making the access of citizens to justice possible; (2) encouraging political processes guided by credibility and competitiveness, with initiatives that support electoral reform, including education programs for voters and strengthening of political parties; (3) development of a politically active civil society, with initiatives toward the rise of citizen participation in the political processes, control of public institutions, institutional and financial strengthening of civil society organizations, and incentives to the free circulation of information and to a democratic political culture; (4) encouraging transparency and responsibility in government institutions, with initiatives that promote the decentralization functions and decision making processes, strengthening the legislative bodies, government, unity, and the civil-military relationships.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the positive evaluation of the changes made in relation to the political and economic liberalization, the emphasis of USAID is on the reforms of the "second generation" that are focused on deepening democracy. In relation to politics, the focus is on four aspects: the rule of law, the decentralization of the decisions and democratic practices adopted by the local governments, the creation of conditions to strengthen the civil society, and freedom of the press. These actions are considered strategic to the national interests of the United States in the region.

To reduce pressure of the LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) region's poor to seek refuge and better opportunities in the United States, and to enhance political stability and economic prosperity in all of the Americas, it is critical that the U.S. government ensure that LAC countries continue in their transitions from conflict to peace and reconciliation, from dictatorships to democracy, and from controlled economies with massive inequity to open markets and determined efforts to alleviate poverty.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, three priority actions are proposed: (1) the strengthening of the regional mechanisms to promote human rights and the rule of law, especially through the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights (IHR), in which the Inter-disciplinary Course on Human Rights is offered;<sup>14</sup> (2) promoting a regional approach in favor of the legitimacy of the public service; strengthening mechanisms of transparency, state administration accountability, and decentralization of decision-making in municipal governments;<sup>15</sup> (3) strengthening of regional mechanisms in favor of pluralism.

The development of these actions does not happen in a unilateral way, since there is a concern to link them to the collective decisions of the Summits of the Americas. The Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago culminated a yearlong effort of presidential engagement in hemispheric affairs. At the summit, the



Heads of State of the 34 democracies in the region set forth certain regional initiatives that could be accomplished over the next three to five years. These initiatives focused on a "second generation" of reforms aimed at deepening the trend toward democratic governance in the region and removing the barriers to the participation of the poor in the national life of their countries.<sup>16</sup>

Next, we analyze the importance of the summits in the process of the elaboration of the hemispheric agenda of the United States, especially in the themes related to governance, comparing the predominant orientations of the Clinton and Bush governments.

### The Architecture of Hemispheric Relations

As pointed out in the previous section, in the United States' view of foreign policy, the Western Hemisphere presents itself as a region in transition, in which peace among the nations, political democracy, and free market economy emerge as unquestionable trends. In terms of the consolidation of this trajectory, as Luis J. Lauredo, the representative of the United States in the OAS, affirms, the problem is in the details:

is in the details of democracy, in the details of human rights, and in the details of a free market economy that we all must work to ensure the Western Hemisphere does not slip back into the precipice into dictatorship and ultimately, war.<sup>17</sup>

Concern regarding the details in the transition process goes toward a redefinition of the parameters that guide hemispherical relations, leading to the construction of a new architecture whose main stage is the Summit of the Americas, inaugurated by the Clinton government in 1994.

The Summit of the Americas, which began as an informal gathering of heads of state in Miami in 1994, has evolved into a valuable forum for participants to resolve common political, economic, and social issues in an environment of mutual respect and cooperation. In a nutshell, it embodies the leaders' hemispheric agenda for the future. It is the new architecture of hemispheric relations based on common values of democracy, free trade, and on the shared responsibility to be proactive in defending these values.<sup>18</sup>

The affirmation of such community values among the Summits' participating countries presents itself as the main argument in favor of the institutionalization of negotiation mechanisms, formulation of policies, follow-up, and control of this joint trajectory. The pursuit of national interest transcends the Democrat or Republican origin of the administration in power. Although there are differences of approach between the Clinton and the Bush administrations, there is no great discrepancy in the definition of the basic pillars that should rule the hemispheric convergence: liberal democracy and free market economy.

Stemming from the establishment of a basic consensus among the Summit participants regarding these two aspects, the process of negotiations

involving the details of a new architecture works with a wide agenda:

we are developing policies to make governments across the hemisphere more transparent, accessible, and less corrupt. We are looking for ways to promote the administration of justice, increase respect for human rights, and strengthen the rule of law. We are looking at ways to improve countries' abilities to prepare and respond to natural disasters and to improve people's access to quality health care and to a quality education. We are looking for ways to improve labor and environmental conditions in the hemisphere. We are also discussing ways to bridge the digital divide within our hemisphere and ensure that the promise of information technologies benefits our peoples.<sup>19</sup>

In the expectation of identifying the arguments that make the perception of Latin America and the Caribbean more explicit, the main themes of the agenda are grouped around two issues: economical governance, which especially involves the proposal for the creation of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and political governance, associated with the negotiation of collective mechanisms of follow-up and control in the transition.

The proposal for the creation of the FTAA by 2005, a date which was ratified in the Summit of Quebec in April 2001, gives continuity to the Americas Initiative, formulated in the 1990s by President George Bush. In terms of national historic antecedents, the starting point asserted by the government is the proposal of the Secretary of State James Blaine in the first Pan-American Conference in 1889 for the creation of a Customs Union.

In March 1998, during the preparation of the Summit of Santiago, Secretary Albright presented an important historical milestone that incorporated, in the foundations of the hemispheric identity, Hispano-American references:

Simon Bolivar wanted the Americas to be measured not by her vast area and wealth, but "by her freedom and her glory." Today, that vision is closer to reality than it has ever been. For as we meet, with one exception,<sup>20</sup> every government in the hemisphere is freely elected; every economy has liberalized its system for investment and trade.<sup>21</sup>

However, between the two cited references, the Pan-Americanism started by Blaine is the one that points out the initiative of the United States. As the Trade Representative of the United States Robert Zoellick, in George W. Bush's government states in his address at the Council of the Americas, in which he draws his conclusions regarding the Summit in Quebec: "Today, as I look at the Americas, I see a driving purpose: a belief in democracy and freedom, and a rediscovery of the vision that motivated those who called for the first Pan-American Congress over 100 years ago."<sup>22</sup>

Referring to the change of strategic perspective in the relationship between the great powers and their neighbors, Zoellick highlights the contrasting reality of the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries:

In the 19th century, many strong countries wanted weak neighbors that they could dominate. In the 21st century, strong countries will benefit from healthy, prosperous, and confident democratic neighbors. Troubled neighbors export



problems like illegal immigration, environmental damage, crime, narcotics, and violence. Healthy neighbors create stronger regions through economic integration and political cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

The regional example stressed by Zoellick is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that promoted an increase in trade between the United States and Mexico from \$81 billion in 1993 to \$247 billion in 2000 and increased the volume of exports to Canada to a level that is the equivalent of the exports to Europe (respectively \$179 and \$187 billion in 2000). In this process, 2.2 million jobs were created in Mexico, 1.3 million in Canada, and 13 million in the United States.<sup>24</sup> In relation to the economic projections associated with the creation of FTAA, the outlook is extremely favorable. According to the data presented by the Bureau of Hemispheric Affairs from the Department of State, since 1995 the exports to Latin America have risen at an annual rate of 10 percent, twice as much as in relation to Europe.<sup>25</sup>

Referring to the internal critics of the FTAA, who fear a loss of jobs in the United States, Lauredo is emphatic when defending the initiative:

Latin American countries have some of the world's highest tariff rates—on average, 4 times higher than U.S. tariff rates. The FTAA will eliminate most tariffs, making it more profitable for American companies to export to the region. More American exports mean more American jobs. Second . . . Latin America is our fastest growing export market, accounting for two-thirds of U.S. export growth worldwide and 40% of total U.S. merchandise exports. Third, as growth rates increase and inflation falls, the demand for products and services amongst consumers in Latin America is increasing. . . . If the U.S. doesn't take advantage of the growing Latin market, our competitors in Europe and Asia will. Fourth, free trade has non-economic benefits to the United States. Trade promotes ties between our people and stable regional economies work against the drug trade and migration because people can find legitimate jobs in their countries.<sup>26</sup>

In relation to the fourth aspect mentioned by Lauredo, the consensus in the governmental analysis is that the deepening of the economic interdependence contributes to governance. As Zoellick points out,

Trade agreements such as NAFTA and the FTAA promote good governance by creating obligations for transparency in government and adherence to the rule of law. . . . Similarly, trade fosters political cooperation. . . . Indeed, we have seen throughout Latin America that growing economic integration has led to a lessening of old regional suspicions and tensions, whether between Chile and Argentina or between Peru and Ecuador. Trade also spurs improvements in education. As people start businesses, and foreign companies invest their capital, standards for education rise to meet the demands of the new economy.<sup>27</sup>

The data concerning the potential impact of FTAA in the growth of exports and the level of employment in the United States leave little doubt regarding the role of Latin America and the Caribbean in the viability of the economic

prosperity goals of the Department of State's Strategic Plan 2000. In addition, there is the recognition that the liberalization process may contribute to the onset of situations of instability in a region in transition. As Secretary Albright makes explicit,

Neither democracy nor prosperity can endure unless they are broadly based. The policies of free markets and open investment, which are the keys to sustained growth, are vulnerable to challenge if too many people feel shut out or left behind and as we have seen in parts of Asia, a booming economy can shift rapidly into reverse if problems of cronyism, corruption, and lack of accountability are not addressed.<sup>28</sup>

This concern was present in the summits in Santiago in April 1998, in Quebec in 2001, and in the Extraordinary Summit of Monterrey in January 2004, in which, parallel to the discussions regarding the implementation of FTAA, initiatives toward the adjustment of the political governance agenda were defined. In the area of education, targets were set regarding the access and attendance of 100 percent of the children in primary school and 75 percent in secondary school, up to 2010. In the area of preservation and strengthening of democracy, justice and human rights, we can highlight the initiatives established toward local development, through the strengthening of the municipal and regional administrations, stimulating the participation of society in the processes of decision-making; the combat against corruption, with the adoption of OAS programs that encourage administrative honesty and legal action against money laundering; prevention and control of consumption and traffic of illegal drugs; combat and elimination of terrorism and fostering trust and security amongst the states, institutionally strengthening the inter-American system. In the area of discrimination and eradication of poverty, the fomenting of micro, small, and medium enterprises can be highlighted; the respect for labor rights based on the ILO; gender equality, promoting judicial equality between women and men.

In the Extraordinary Summit in Monterrey, in which 13 new heads of state participated, although the main objectives defined in the previous meetings were reaffirmed, the agenda of discussions incorporated new international and regional realities that happened between 2001 and 2003. In this perspective, three themes gained special emphasis: (1) the combat against terrorism, which had become a priority in the global agenda of the United States after the September 11, 2001 attack, being incorporated as the central element in the so-called new regional threats; (2) political governance, especially in the sequence of crisis in the last two years, involving the events that led to the resignation of the elected presidents of Argentina (2001) and Bolivia (2003); (3) the process of implementing FTAA, regarding the deepening of divergences between Brazil and the United States about deadlines and the scope of economical liberalization, following the rise of Lula's government.



In the final declaration of the meeting, the agreements reached concerning these themes are made explicit. In the issues connected with security, among the main regional and global threats, the problems of terrorism and production of weapons of mass destruction are highlighted, which are also the two central arguments for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, together with the tyrannical character of Saddam Hussein's government.

This is our first meeting since the tragic events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. We reiterate that terrorism, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are serious threats to international security, to institutions, to democratic values in the States and to the well-being of our peoples. We have resolved to intensify our cooperation and face these threats.<sup>29</sup>

Concerning governance, the document explicitly defends representative democracy as a basic unit of principles regarding the government system that should guide the hemispheric community, emphasizing the combat against corruption as an effective way of reaching transparency, efficiency, and optimization of economic resources in favor of social development:

We recognize that political pluralism and solid political parties are essential elements of democracy. We stress the importance of norms that ensure transparency in their finances, avoid corruption and the risk of improper influences, and stimulate a high level of electoral participation. Therefore, we will promote the conditions that allow political parties to develop in an autonomous way, without government control.<sup>30</sup>

Concerning the FTAA, the document incorporates the agreements that were sealed in the eighteenth ministerial meeting in Miami in November 2003. After previous understandings between Brazil and the United States (both presiding at this stage of the negotiations) a conclusive common position was reached in the negotiating process in 2005, with the creation of an area of free trade. The new proposal, ratified in Monterrey, and nick-named FTAA Light, is less ambitious than the original project. Although it does not question the wider perspective that should guide the integration agenda, it aims to guarantee increased flexibility in the recognition of the diversity of situations that involve the economies of the region, enabling countries to establish different levels of commitment.<sup>31</sup>

On different dates, yet in the same place, the Council of the Americas (officials from the Department of State from both the Clinton and Bush administrations) enunciates the main consensus reached in the hemisphere through the diplomacy of presidential summits. Referring to the decisions of the Summit of Santiago, in May 1999, Madeleine Albright stresses the following aspects:

There were initiatives... to strengthen local governments and thereby broaden opportunities for political participation. There were strategies to formalize property rights, including the assets of the poor, such as houses or farms. There were programs to reinforce the rule of law, including creation of

hemispheric justice studies centers. There was support for the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption<sup>32</sup>... And there were proposals, in which USAID is actively participating, to increase support for micro enterprise, which is particularly important to the economic empowerment of women.<sup>33</sup>

Weighing up the decisions at the Summit of Quebec, in May 2001, Bush's Secretary of State, Colin Powell, emphasizes the combination of initiatives that aim to tackle the most urgent regional situations, especially in the Andean area and in the Caribbean—considered as a third border jointly with Canada and Mexico—affirming the two central pillars of the Inter-American agenda, democracy, and free market:

Some of what we did in Quebec was regional. We did some preventive medicine to help Colombia's neighbors defend themselves against the spillover of narco-guerrilla activity. We did this by announcing and giving our support to an Andean regional initiative... not just to focus on narco-trafficking in Colombia but to see the problem as a regional problem and to invest in human rights activities, to invest in infrastructure development, to invest in economic opportunities that will encourage people to move away from narco-trafficking... And we passed a strong initiative on HIV-AIDS and other issues related to the Caribbean island nations... What we have taken to describe here in the United States as a third border initiative... But all of these regional initiatives took place within the context of a much larger vision... That open markets and good government are closely linked, and that even as we generate investment and create jobs, we need to work toward accountable democratic institutions and democratic practices.<sup>34</sup>

In a speech that presented the agenda of discussions in the Summit in Monterrey, in January 2004, the Assistant Secretary of the State Department for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega, recognized the economic problems faced by the majority of the population in Latin America and the Caribbean, revealing a loss of credibility of countries that promote liberalizing reforms, though making it clear that the direction, regarding both politics and the economy, should follow the lineaments collectively defined in the context of the presidential summits: democracy, the rule of law, the fostering of free enterprise, and free trade.

Unless women and men from all walks of life have a stake in economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, the gap between rich and poor will widen, and genuine prosperity may prove illusive or unsustainable. We know the answer: democracy and the rule of law are essential to global development and trade, because they empower individuals to share the costs and the blessings of prosperity.<sup>35</sup>

In August 2005, Noriega left his position in the State Department; he was substituted by Thomas A. Shannon Jr. inaugurating his performance in the private initiative as Visiting Fellow in the American Enterprise, he analyzed the challenges that president Bush had ahead of the IV Presidential Summit to take place in November in Mar del Plata, Argentina.



Aware of the negative climate to take up the agenda of the Washington Consensus, which is associated with the combined effect of economic and political difficulties of the region, with the fall of governments that defend the liberal reforms in Argentina and Bolivia, and the promotion of Left leadership like Lula, Kirchner, and Chavez, he recommends that the U.S. Government take a firm attitude in the defense of the objectives that speed up the process initiated in Miami in 1994.

At the summit, President George W. Bush pressed his colleagues to reemphasize their commitments to defend democracy and the rule of law, deepen economic reforms, and expand trade as a recipe for sustained, equitable growth. But there were a significant number of Latin leaders who tried to scuttle this work plan and served up sympathetic rhetoric to cynically court the poor.<sup>36</sup>

Noriega's fear was confirmed at the meeting. Despite the United States Government's efforts to continue with the commercial negotiations, there was a strong resistance from the MERCOSUR countries and Venezuela who opposed the inclusion of FTAA in the discussion guidelines, defending to keep the theme that convened the meeting, "Creating decent job opportunities, sustained economic growth; Fighting poverty; and Strengthening democratic governance and institutions."

That position prevailed, despite the strong pressure exerted by the United States, Mexico, and Canada. On the other hand, the opposition to the resumption of commercial negotiations by the five South American countries does not involve the consensus on the future of the FTAA project, since the positions vary from the open rejection of the Venezuelan head of state to the undefined postponement proposed by the other countries.

Despite the differences expressed at the meeting of presidents, bilateral relations of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela with the United States flow smoothly. A theme privileged by Kirchner at his meeting with Bush during the Summit was to obtain support in the negotiations of Argentina with the IMF on the foreign debt. One of the positive results of Mar del Plata highlighted by Bush was the investment bilateral agreement signed with the president of Uruguay, Tabare Vazquez. In a visit to Brazil after the Summit Meeting, Bush strongly praised the economic effort of the government of Lula and his positive leadership in the region, thus confirming the favorable moment of bilateral relations. After the official visit to Paraguay in September by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, there was a strengthening of military bonds between the two countries. Despite the confrontational speeches of Chavez and Bush, bilateral trade continues to be expanded and Venezuela stays as the third largest commercial partner of the United States following Mexico and Brazil.<sup>37</sup>

### **The Bush Government and Security—a Pre-9/11 Priority**

If we observe the differences between the governments of Clinton and Bush in relation to the value of the way of life as the main basis of a hemispheric community, there are different emphases in the definition of priorities. These

priorities are not determined by the circumstances after September 11, 2001, as shown below and drawn from documents previous to the attacks.

In his presentation of the proposed budget for International Affairs for 2002, in May 2001, Powell requested an increase of 2 percent in relation to the previous year, arguing that there is a perception of greater levels of instability in the world in transition. The proposal defines the following priority areas: reform of USAID; bilateral economic assistance; international control of narcotics and the rule of law; assistance to migration and refugees; nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and clearance of minefields; military assistance; and multilateral programs of economic aid.

In the analysis of the document, we highlight the change of approach in relation to Albright's administration showing the main items related to political governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Concerning the restructuring of USAID, presented as the main theme in the justification of the new budget, there is a redefinition of the focus of action of the Agency, which assumes globalization and prevention of conflicts as core points of international assistance, directing resources and activities to three main programs: economic growth and agriculture, global health and prevention of conflicts, and support development.

The two first points maintain essentially the same orientation of the former administration. In the case of agriculture, besides its key role as an economic activity to which the majority of the poor population in most developing countries is linked, most of the conflicts in these regions are rooted in the rural areas. Therefore, the main objectives of the program are to increase economic opportunities, stimulating the expansion of property, the improvement of productivity and the efficiency in the management of natural resources, and the promotion of training and education activities.

The third program illustrates the main changes of focus, subordinating the actions to this theme, which were previously part of the specific aim of the Strategic Plan, the "strengthening of democracy and good government." Initiatives of humanitarian assistance are also attached to this program. As Powell puts it,

Given the rising number of collapsed states and internal conflicts in the post-Cold War period, some of which have become focal points of U.S. foreign policy, USAID will undertake a major new conflict prevention, management, and resolution initiative. This initiative will integrate the existing portfolio of USAID democracy programs with new approaches to anticipating crisis, conflict analysis, comprehensive assessment, and will provide new methodologies to assist conflicting parties resolve their issues peacefully.<sup>38</sup>

The arguments presented by the director of the USAID, Andrew Natsios, when justifying the funds requested for Latin America and the Caribbean, clearly synthesize the perception of the region in the country's foreign policy:

Because the countries assisted by USAID in Latin America and the Caribbean are our neighbors, their economic, social, and political development have an extremely important impact on our own security and well-being. Americans



benefit directly when the economies of developing LAC countries expand and their markets open. Since 1990, the number of U.S. jobs supported by exports to the region has increased by 2.3 million. But when nations in this region face political instability and failing economies, the United States sees the consequences directly through increased illegal immigration and illegal narcotics. None of us should ignore the cross-border spread of communicable diseases such as TB and HIV/AIDS. Finally, environmental degradation and pollution can affect U.S. Border States directly and also aggravate regional instability and migration, as well as increase the risk of death and destruction from disasters in the region.<sup>39</sup>

### Continuity and Change

Are there great innovations in George W. Bush's foreign policy as compared to his predecessor? The answer would be yes. If we compare the description of threats, the definition of objectives, and the goals of the strategic plans drafted by the State Department through Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell actions, we perceive more similarities than differences.

The document, *U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan*, released in 1999, defines and articulates national interests and strategic goals (table 4.1) seeking

Table 4.1 U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan (2000)

National interests	Strategic goals
National Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent regional instabilities from threatening U.S. vital national interests.</li> <li>• Reduce the threat to the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD).</li> </ul>
Economic prosperity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Open foreign markets to increase trade and free the flow of goods, services, and capital.</li> <li>• Expand U.S. exports to \$1.2 trillion by early twenty-first century.</li> <li>• Increase global economic growth and stability.</li> <li>• Promote broad-based growth in developing and transitional economies to raise standards of living, reduce poverty, and lessen disparities of wealth within and among countries.</li> </ul>
American citizens and U.S. borders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the safety and security of American citizens who travel and live abroad.</li> <li>• Facilitate travel to the United States by foreign visitors, immigrants, and refugees, while deterring entry by those who abuse or threaten our system.</li> </ul>
Law enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.</li> <li>• Reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States.</li> <li>• Reduce the incidence and severity of international terrorist attacks, particularly against American citizens and interests.</li> </ul>
Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Open political systems and societies to democratic practices, the rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights.</li> </ul>

Continued

Table 4.1 Continued

National interests	Strategic goals
Humanitarian Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent or minimize the human costs of conflict and natural disasters.</li> </ul>
Global issues: Environment, health, and population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secure a sustainable global environment to protect the U.S. citizens and interests from the effects of international environmental degradation.</li> <li>• Achieve a healthy and sustainable world population.</li> <li>• Strengthen international health capabilities.</li> </ul>

Source: Fuente: Datos extraídos del U.S. Strategic Plan 2000 (USDS, 2002, pp. 11–12).

to respond to the transformations that have taken place as of 1990, outlining the surroundings of a new agenda that has as its main point the appraisal of the international development of the United States in a world marked by the growing dissolution of boundaries between domestic and international affairs.

Defined by reference to the past, the post-cold war era has as its most significant attribute the absence of any immediate, vital threat to national security. The demise of the Soviet Union has left the United States as the preeminent world power and invested it with unparalleled leadership responsibilities and opportunities. But the end of superpower competition has also eliminated the unifying strategy for U.S. foreign policy. Now, in addition to regional security issues, an array of threats—weapons proliferation, terrorism, ethnic and religious conflict, organized crime, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation—challenges U.S. interests and blurs the traditional dividing lines between domestic and foreign affairs.<sup>40</sup>

In August 2003, Colin Powell announced the strategic plan for 2004–2009, a document drafted jointly with USAID, which outlines objectives and goals (table 4.2) adjusted to the context prior to September 11, 2001. In keeping with the priorities attributed to the security and preventive combat of new threats, the document reaffirms the significance of the U.S. international leadership:

We will strive to strengthen traditional alliances and build new relationships to achieve a peace that brings security, but when necessary, we will act alone to face the challenges, provide assistance, and seize the opportunities of this era. U.S. leadership is essential for promoting this vision, but others must share the responsibility. The history of American foreign policy suggests that we will increase our chances of success abroad by exerting principled leadership while seeking to work with others to achieve our goals.<sup>41</sup>

The comparison of tables 4.1 and 4.2 shows operational changes in the organization of strategic objectives and goals, searching for a greater focus on the theme of security to which development and governance are explicitly linked, including a specific item on the defense of the national territory. Out of those aspects, there was not verification of differences in the content that can indicate substantial drifting apart from the strategic visions. The main points outlined in the document of 2000 are also present in the 2004–2009 document with alterations that express responses to the scenario shaped by 9/11.



Table 4.2 State Department and USAID Strategic Plan (2004–2009)

Strategic objectives	Strategic and performance goals
Achieve peace and security	<i>Regional stability</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Close, strong, and effective U.S. ties with allies, friends, partners, and regional organizations.</li> <li>• Existing and emergent regional conflicts are contained or resolved.</li> </ul>
	<i>Counterterrorism</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coalition partners identify, deter, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists.</li> <li>• U.S. and foreign governments actively combat terrorist financing.</li> <li>• Coordinated international prevention and response to terrorism, including bioterrorism.</li> <li>• Stable political and economic conditions that prevent terrorism from flourishing in fragile or failing states.</li> </ul>
Advance sustainable development and global interests	<i>Homeland security</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Denial of visas to foreign citizens who would abuse or threaten the United States, while facilitating entry of legitimate applicants.</li> <li>• Implemented international agreements stop the entry of goods that could harm the United States, while ensuring the transfer of bona fide materials.</li> </ul>
	<i>Weapons of mass destruction</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bilateral measures, including the promotion of new technologies, to combat the proliferation of WMD and reduce stockpiles.</li> <li>• Strengthened multilateral WMD agreements and nuclear energy cooperation under appropriate conditions.</li> </ul>
	<i>American citizens</i>
	U.S. citizens have the consular information, services, and protection they need to reside, conduct business, or travel abroad.
	<i>Democracy and human rights</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Measures adopted to develop transparent and accountable democratic institutions, laws, and economic and political processes and practices.</li> <li>• Universal standards protect human rights, including the rights of women and ethnic minorities, religious freedom, worker rights, and the reduction of child labor.</li> </ul>
	<i>Economic prosperity and security</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutions, laws, and policies foster private sector-led growth, macroeconomic stability, and poverty reduction.</li> <li>• Increased trade and investment achieved through market-opening, international agreements and further integration of developing countries into the trading system.</li> <li>• Secure and stable financial and energy markets.</li> <li>• Enhanced food security and agricultural development.</li> </ul>
	<i>Social and environmental issues</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved global health, including child, maternal, and reproductive health, and the reduction of abortion and disease, especially HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.</li> <li>• Partnerships, initiatives, and implemented international treaties and agreements that protect the environment and promote efficient energy use and resource management.</li> </ul>
	<i>Humanitarian response</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective protection, assistance, and durable solutions for refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict victims.</li> </ul>

Continued

Table 4.2 Continued

Strategic objectives	Strategic and performance goals
Promote international understanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved capacity of host countries and the international community to reduce vulnerabilities to disasters and anticipate and respond to humanitarian emergencies.</li> <li>• Public diplomacy and public affairs</li> <li>• Public diplomacy influences global public opinion and decision-making consistent with U.S. national interests.</li> <li>• International exchanges increase mutual understanding and build trust between Americans and people and institutions around the world.</li> <li>• Basic human values embraced by Americans are respected and understood by global public and institutions.</li> </ul>
	<i>Management and organizational excellence</i>
Strengthen diplomatic and program capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A high performing, well-trained, and diverse workforce aligned with mission requirements.</li> <li>• Modernized, secure, and high quality information technology management and infrastructure that meet critical business requirements.</li> <li>• Personnel are safe from physical harm and national security information is safe from compromise.</li> <li>• Secure, safe, and functional facilities serving domestic and overseas staff.</li> </ul>

Source: Data extracted from the Strategic Plan 2004–2009 (USDS, 2003 Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004–2009, [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/state\\_usaid\\_strat\\_plan.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/state_usaid_strat_plan.pdf), pp. 42–4).

On the other hand, an important change of emphasis is verified in relation to the degree of danger in the new forms of conflict. Different from the Strategic Plan 2000, that underlines the absence of immediate and vital threats to national security, there is, on the part of the government of Bush, a growing overexcitement of terrorism as an existential enemy not only to the United States but more to the world order, expressed with satisfaction in a speech given at the National Endowment for Democracy in March 2005.

First, these extremists want to end American and Western influence in the broader Middle East, because we stand for democracy and peace, and stand in the way of their ambitions. . . . Second, the militant network wants to use the vacuum created by an American retreat to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments. . . . Third, the militants believe that controlling one country will rally the Muslim masses, enabling them to overthrow all moderate governments in the region, and establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia. With greater economic and military and political power, the terrorists would be able to advance their stated agenda: to develop weapons of mass destruction, to destroy Israel, to intimidate Europe, to assault the American people, and to blackmail our government into isolation.<sup>42</sup>



**Table 4.3** Terrorist Attacks and Number (A-V)\* of Victims per Region 1996–2003

Year	Africa	Asia A-V	Eurasia A-V	Latin America A-V	Middle East A-V	North America A-V	Western Europe A-V
1996	11–80	11–1507	24–20	84–18	45–1097	0–0	121–503
1997	11–21	21–344	42–27	128–11	37–480	13–7	52–17
1998	21–5379	49–635	14–12	111–195	31–58	0–0	48–405
1999	53–185	72–690	35–8	122–9	26–31	2–0	85–16
2000	55–100	98–898	31–103	192–20	20–78	0–0	30–4
2001	33–150	68–651	3–0	194–6	29–513	4–4091	7–20
2002	5–12	99–1281	7–615	50–52	29–772	0–0	9–6
2003	6–14	80–1427	2–0	20–79	67–1823	0–0	33–928

Source: Drafted on the basis of information of the report on *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003* (U.S.D.S., 2004).

Note: \*A = Number of Attacks; V = Number of Victims.

The demarcation of the level of threat is an essential indicator for the definition of the present international posture of the United States. The perception of a growing insecure world will feed the national and global policies focussed on security. Nevertheless, if we take the data on terrorist incidents of the very State Department as reference, the conclusion is that there was an improvement in the years that followed the end of the cold war. The annual mean of attacks varied from 544,44 between 1982 and 1990 to 352,61 between 1991 and 2003.<sup>43</sup> Accordingly table 4.3 shows that in the period 1996–2003 the main alterations are not given by the number of attacks but by the number of fatalities.

### Final Considerations

... Leaders and political thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that emanates from defining the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends to be related to intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and attractive institutions.<sup>44</sup>

Being hallucinated by progress, we believed that progress meant forgetting, leaving behind the manifestations of the best we have done, an extremely rich culture of a continent which is native-Indian, European, black, mixed-race and mulatto, whose creativity has not yet found its economical equivalence, whose continuity has not yet found a political correspondence.<sup>45</sup>

The documents analyzed in the previous sections show common ground in terms of defending the posture of international leadership in the Clinton and Bush administrations. Nevertheless, there is a shift in the emphasis from the Republican government regarding governance, in which the prevention and resolution of conflicts are given more prominence. Different from the emphatic speeches of the Clinton period, when democracy was exalted as the

ultimate aim in the conquest of peace and prosperity, with Bush, the emphasis is in its operational significance, as one of the means to service of order.

Regarding the characterization of the countries, a conception based on proximity and attitude in relation to liberal democracy and capitalism is maintained. Representative democracy, free market, and the rule of law compose a common core, whose recognition, from the “rest” makes diversity negotiable.

In the view of the U.S. government, the instability factors engendered in the developing world make the increasing international involvement both necessary and inevitable. The defense of this posture does not stem from humanitarian priorities, but from national interests that link security to economic prosperity of the country, its businesses and citizens.

From this perspective, culture and interest are intertwined. The defense of values considered as universal is part of the objective of creating a free and safe world environment for the circulation of goods, services, and American citizens. Based on this conception, the foreign policy unfolds itself in three courses of action: the promotion of the opening of foreign markets; the aid to countries in transition and in development; military intervention in regions in process of collapse or that face aggression from terrorist groups or “rogue” states.

In relation to the first course of action, the two main mechanisms are negotiation of trade agreements and the strengthening of the regulatory power/ability of the multilateral economic institutions. The main targets of commercial liberalization are the transition countries, the biggest area of expansion of exports, which combine little familiarity with the market economy and a protectionist tradition of limited scope, generally aimed toward the support of traditional oligarchies. This situation strengthens the position of the United States, which is capable of presenting a wide and sophisticated agenda, linking the opening of markets with the establishment of regulatory mechanisms of the competing countries.<sup>46</sup> In addition, these mechanisms have their own legislation and that of multilateral organisms as references, in which their influence is notorious. Thus, spreading values such as free enterprise and the rule of law substantially contribute to the realization of the strategies of the Department of State related to expansion of investment, employment, and consumption in its own country.

Despite the success that has been achieved in carrying out these targets, the path is not free from obstacles. On the other side of the negotiating table, one can identify a group of heterogeneous countries that are equally incapable of formulating suitable agendas of international inclusion for these new times. In order to avoid or lessen catastrophic unfolding in this lack of strategic perspective, it becomes urgent to construct a new architecture that legalizes (in general agreement) parameters for this relationship, defining principles, values, and norms, as well as the instruments for vigilance and punishment. In the words of the United States in the OAS, Luis Laurodo, “the devil is in the details.”



The expansion of markets and businesses may be made more difficult in different ways: through protectionist discrimination, through the growth of poverty and exclusion, through conflicts that isolate regions from the routes of global capital, and through a sense of insecurity derived from the increase of terrorism. The first is solved by wide-ranging liberalization agreements, invested resources, and expected returns. For the rest, the answers attempt to adequately combine local actions of preventive aid, surgical interventions to isolate and control chaotic situations, and attacks to targets situated in countries accused of supporting terrorism. As the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq show, the breadth of the interventions may include war and destabilization of the existing order, followed by the imposition of trustworthy authorities.

In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, knowingly far from the level of conflict observed in the Middle East, the priorities the Department of State programs are the "second generation" reforms. This option is based on four main presuppositions: (1) in the region, the ideological battle against the critics of liberalism is over; (2) the structural reforms are irreversible; (3) the business community, regardless of their country of origin, act based on global logic; (4) there are no significant national restrictions—capable of resisting any negotiation process—in relation to the free circulation of capitals and goods.

As a consequence, the emphasis of the discourse changes, from the unrestricted defense of the market, to the social and cultural barriers that affect development. The neoliberal offensive in favor of opening of markets and deregulation gives way to a strategy that aims to promote initiatives capable of spreading values and practices that strengthen, in the basis of society, the structural reforms implemented by the central power.

On the aid agenda, investments in programs of local action are prioritized, directing resources to the regions that face situations of conflict that are related to the security agenda. In this process, special attention is given to education, to the strengthening of the civil society—especially in the most sensitive areas of governance, related to the violation of legality, to exclusion and discrimination—as well as sustainable development. On a local level, municipal programs—with the consequent decentralization of decision-making processes—favor the adoption of approaches and work methods that transfer the responsibility for solving problems and facing challenges to the community.

Differently from the U.S. governments that clearly conceives its interests and objectives in the hemisphere, the Latin America and the Caribbean lack a perspective that articulates the whole region. The Summit Agreements that have been analyzed demonstrate that there is no questioning regarding the basic grounds of the initiatives proposed by Clinton and Bush. The definition of the agenda and the framework of the debate still remain with the United States.

At the Mar del Plata Summit the differences emerged stronger between MERCOSUR, Venezuela, and the other countries in the hemisphere in relation to the commercial liberation agenda. Argentina, Brazil, and

Venezuela were looking for an agreement to formulate a regional alternative. The main reference is the South American Community of Nations, created in December 2004, through which the three countries promote joint initiatives on fundamental themes such as communications, natural resources, and financing for regional development.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the difference of discourse in relation to the United States, a realistic perspective prevails. The countries that adopt state policies seek for greater autonomy in their international insertion, defining convergences, and differences with the Northern power. Although still restricted to South America, the initiatives of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are aimed at a regional perspective of broader range, and its potential remains open. As Carlos Fuentes's quotation at the beginning of this section correctly synthesizes, Latin America faces the challenges that are characteristic of a region "whose creativity has not yet found its economical equivalence, whose continuity has not yet found a political correspondence."

### Notes

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4. Christopher, "Investing."
5. Madeleine Albright, Press Briefing, December 20, 2000, Washington, DC, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, on <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/001220.html>. Accessed on April 30, 2001.
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12. The analysis is based on the USAID document, 2001, chapter 2.
13. USAID, Congressional Presentation FY 2000, Latin America and the Caribbean Presentation, on [www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/](http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/). Accessed on April 30, 2001.
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15. USAID, Congressional Presentation FY 2000, Overview of Latin America and the Caribbean, on [www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/](http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/). Accessed on April 30, 2001.
16. Ibid.
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18. Lauredo, "Toward the Quebec City Summit," Remarks to the Institute of the Americas 2000. Washington, DC, 29 de março em [www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/soa/](http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/soa/). Accessed on April 30, 2001.
19. Ibid.
20. Cuba is the exception, which was excluded by the United States, based on the argument that the establishment of democracy is a pre-requisite to participate in the summits. See Luis Ayerbe, 2003 O Ocidente e o "Resto": a América Latina e o Caribe na cultura do Império (Buenos Aires: CLACSO-ASDI).
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30. Ibid.
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32. Among the main determinations of the Interamerican Convention against corruption, we can highlight the following: the possibility of criminally prosecuting civil servants that demand or receive benefits, as well as other people involved in this act of offering, promising or bribing in exchange for attitudes or omissions in the development of state officers' responsibilities; the penalties have the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as a reference, which defines cooperation procedures, especially regarding issues such as extradition. (U.S.D.S., 2001b).
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44. Joseph Nye, *O Paradoxo do Poder Americano* (São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2002), p. 37.
45. Arizpe, Lourdes "Cultura, creatividad y gobernabilidad," em Mato, Daniel. (Comp.) *Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre cultura y transformaciones sociales en tiempos de globalización*, (Buenos Aires: CLACSO-ASDI, 2001), p. 33.
46. Analyzing the diplomacy of presidential summits, Rojas Aravena (2000) detaches the difficulties of adaptation of the Latin American countries to follow the execution of the initiatives approved in each meeting. Adding the agreements and proposals approved between 1990 and 1999 in the Summits of the Americas (295), of the Latin American Summits (471), of the Group of Rio (347) and the APEC for the Cooperation in the Pacific Basin (84), it is arrived a total of 1.197 initiatives. In the case of the developed countries, that count on a permanent team of negotiators specialized in the diverse subjects of the agenda; the systematic accompaniment of the decision-making process is possible. In the case of the Latin American countries, the structure of the foreign policy ministries lacks this level of expertise, compromising the



elaboration of national strategies capable to tie to the macro objectives with the detailing of proposals in the scope of the techniques commissions that elaborate the initiatives to be argued in the presidential meetings.

47. The South American Community of Nations (CASA), founded at the third South American summit in Cuzco, places as one of its fundamental principles the "determination to develop an integrated South American space in political, social, economic, environmental and infrastructure, that fortifies the own identity of South America and contributes, from a subregional perspective and in joint with other experiences of regional integration, for the fortification of Latin America and the Caribbean and grants a greater gravitation and representation to them in the international forums" (Declaration of Cuzco). In March of 2005, the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela emit, in Montevideo, a joint declaration, in which they propose more systematic efforts for the advance in the agreements of CASA "relative to the fortification of the Telesur and the Petrosur, the creation of a not-reimbursable Fund to take care of Fund to take care of the problems acute than they originate themselves in the poverty, a South American Bank for the Development and others". Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, 2005.